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ABSTRACT 
RECONSTRUCTING POVERTY DISCOURSE: 
POVERTY AND REAGAN’S NARRATIVE 
RATIONALITY 
By Ryan Phillip McCullough 
This thesis examines President Ronald Reagan’s poverty discourse during his first term.  Using the work of 
Walter Fisher, this study examines Reagan’s narrative rationality in constructing images of welfare recipients 
and the welfare system in the justification of his policies.  By identifying links between Reagan’s rhetoric and 
the rhetoric of debates leading to the passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), this thesis supports Asen’s (2002) claim that Reagan created a “discursive 
context” that made passage of PRWORA possible.  Moreover, the study suggests the utility of using 
Skowronek’s (1997) “Recurrent Structure of Presidential Authority” in understanding United States 
Presidential Discourse.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
 During the reauthorization of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, P.L. 104-193 (PRWORA), Ron Haskins (2001), a Senior 
Fellow at the Brookings Institution stated: 
After five years, it is reasonable to call the welfare reform law of 1996 the most 
successful large scale social reform since the New Deal. Welfare is down and 
work is up; earnings are up and poverty is down; illegitimacy has stopped its 
relentless increase; and slightly more children now live in two-parent families. 
And a major reason for these felicitous outcomes appears to be that Congress and 
President Clinton decided to scrap the old dependency-inducing welfare system in 
favor of a system based on work in exchange for public support. (¶ 25) 
This statement during the reauthorization of PRWORA indicates two things about the 
legislation. First, the passage of PRWORA, or welfare reform, was a significant moment 
in bipartisanship, and second, welfare reform has made significant steps to reduce 
poverty in America.   
 However, despite the bipartisanship, there is an alternative interpretation of the 
effects PRWORA.  Susan Brin Hyatt (2001), assistant professor of Anthropology at 
Temple University, in The New Poverty Studies: The Ethnography of Power, Politics, 
and Impoverish 
ed People in the United States, states:  
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The events and rhetoric that surrounded the passage of the welfare reform 
legislation and those that have taken place subsequently are emblematic of a 
broader series of transformations that are reshaping a political landscape within 
which the “problem of poverty” is growing ever more intractable.  (p. 203) 
In other words, the language that shaped the passage of PRWORA created a political 
context in which poverty will become more and more difficult to abate as a result of “the 
incremental dismantling of the structures of the welfare state” (Hyatt, 2001, p. 203).  
What was significant about the rhetoric of these debates?  
A number of studies (Asen, 2002, 2003; Gring-Pemble, 2001, 2003) indicate the 
importance of the rhetorical construction of poor people, welfare recipients, and the 
welfare system leading up to and during the passage of PRWORA.  This occurred despite 
the historical contradictions that mark poverty and welfare discourses (Asen, 2001, 2002, 
2003).   Who or what was persuasive or significant enough to foster a rhetorical context 
in which support for such sweeping reforms of the welfare system was possible? 
The Turning Point in Welfare Policy Debate 
Robert Asen (2002) tracked the development of images of poor people in the 
public sphere leading to and during welfare reform of the 1990s.  Asen (2002) contends 
“Reagan’s election as the 40th president of the United States represented a turning point 
in social welfare policy deliberations” (p. 68).  Reagan “created a discursive context 
favorable to government retrenchment” (Asen, 2002, p. 68).  Essentially, Reagan set the 
tone for welfare reform of the 1990s.   In creating this context, Asen argues, “Reagan and 
his supporters reversed prevailing political language and returned to moralistic, 
individualistic interpretations of a person’s socioeconomic status” (2002, p. 69).  In other 
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words, Reagan framed an individual’s socioeconomic status as a result of personal 
responsibility.   
 As stated earlier, historically, contradictions marked poverty and welfare 
discourses (Asen, 2001, 2002, 2003).  Specifically, Asen (2002) notes:  
The cross-purposes of sustenance and deterrence and their intersections with 
indexes of deservingness and underservingness have been crucial points of 
departure.  Public assistance has been designed at the same time to force the 
“able-bodied” poor into the paid labor market and to provide relief for the 
deserving poor.  (p. 26).   
Reagan and his supporters “did not mimic historical poverty discourses, nor was their 
discourse simply derivative of past eras. Instead, they invented a Gospel of Wealth for the 
1980s, gesturing to the New Deal in their promise of safety net for the truly needy”(Asen, 
2002, p. 69).  In Reagan’s poverty discourse, by referring to the New Deal, personal 
responsibility and a social safety net could coexist. 
In his specific analysis of Reagan’s discourse, Asen examined speeches on 
February 5, 1981, and February 18, 1981, outlining his economic recovery plan (2002, p. 
82-89).  Drawing from Kenneth Burke, Asen found “multiple associations of equivalence 
and contrariety” in Reagan’s speeches (2002, p. 87).  According to Asen (2002), 
Reagan’s speeches are understood in the following way: “American people = individual 
worker = business operator = American industry = Ronald Reagan ≠ federal government 
= non-needy (cheats, double-dippers, shirkers) = politicians = bureaucrats” (p. 88).  This 
pattern of association and dissociation vilifies the federal government; at the same time, it 
ignores the role of capitalism and “questions of social justice” (Asen, 2002, p. 88).  Asen 
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claims Reagan successfully shifted “frames of reference of deliberation of social welfare 
policy” (2002, p. 82).  While Asen (2002) indicates that Reagan was the turning point, it 
is not clear why his election was the turning point. 
Reagan and Politics of Reconstruction 
In his examination of presidential leadership, Stephen Skowronek (1997) argues 
that “the presidency is a governing institution inherently hostile to inherited governing 
arrangements” (p. 20).  This is especially true for new presidents because “[t]hey would 
assert that their election proceeded on the dislike of the current state of affairs; and, 
acting on that authority, they would be likely to try to change as much about it as they 
could” (Skowronek, 1997, p. 21).  Because of this, Skowronek claims “the power to 
recreate order hinges on the authority to repudiate it.  The recurrent patterns of 
presidential politics are anchored in this paradox. The authority to repudiate is the most 
formidable of all political resources for the exercise of leadership” (1997, p. 27).  
Therefore, presidential authority and power is largely determined by and most potent 
when, it can legitimately decry the previous administrations.   
 Building on this position, Skowronek developed “Recurrent Structures of 
Presidential Authority” (1997, p. 36).  Skowronek identifies four structures for 
presidential action: politics of reconstruction, politics of disjunction, politics of 
articulation, and politics of preemption (1997, p. 36).  Historically, during times of the 
politics of reconstruction, “A great opportunity for presidential action was harnessed at 
these moments to an expansive authority to repudiate the established governing 
formulas” (Skowronek, 1997, p. 37).  Additionally, “when government has been most 
thoroughly discredited, and when political resistance to the presidency is weakest, 
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presidents tend to remake the government wholesale” (Skowronek, 1997, p. 37).  
Presidents during times of the politics of reconstruction have the most authority to 
repudiate and, consequently, have the most power to reshape political order.  
 Reagan was able to claim the authority and power granted by the politics of 
reconstruction; as Skowronek notes, “He came to power in circumstances that recalled 
the great reconstructive crusades of the past” (1997, p. 414).  Because of this, Reagan 
was “thrust to commanding heights by Carter’s flounderings” and “wielded his 
repudiative authority to reconstruct the standards of legitimate political action” 
(Skowronek, 1997, p. 57).  Reagan came to the presidency with the authority to repudiate 
previous administrations and the power to reshape political order.  
 However, before a president can begin to wield the political power given to him, 
as Skowronek notes, a president must construct a narrative: 
The first thing a [president] does is to situate himself in a public discourse, and 
construct a narrative relating what has been done previously to what he proposes 
to do in the moment at hand.  The basic parameters of politics are set here, in the 
president’s initial assertions about who he is and where he sees himself fitting into 
the nation’s history.  
To sustain his narrative—to confirm during the exercise of his powers his 
own presentments about his place in history—a president must be able to preempt 
the authority of others to challenge what is being done and how it is being 
accomplished. Concrete policy accomplishments are important to the leader’s 
prospects in this regard, as are personal setbacks and defeats, but they are 
important only insofar as they bear on the story being told.  (1997, p. 24) 
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Therefore, the narrative presidents construct is central to the politics they make, and the 
narratives the presidents of the politics of reconstruction create hold the most authority 
because they can repudiate previous administrations.   
By viewing Reagan as a president of reconstruction, it is clear why his election 
was the turning point in poverty deliberation, discussion, and discourse; he had the 
political authority to reshape government. Furthermore, because the narrative a president 
constructs is central to his authority and power, an examination of the narrative 
constructed in Reagan’s poverty discourse is appropriate. 
The Narrative Paradigm 
Walter R. Fisher (1984) developed the narrative paradigm as “a dialectical 
synthesis of two traditional strands in the history of rhetoric: the argumentative, 
persuasive theme and the literary, aesthetic theme” (p. 2).  From this stance, judgments 
about the quality of discourse cannot be made by looking entirely at “informal or formal 
logic” (Fisher, 1984, p. 2).  Examining the logic and appropriateness of arguments made 
in discourse falls under what Fisher calls “the rational world paradigm” (1984, p. 4).  
Unfortunately, as Fisher argues, the rational world paradigm fails to accurately critique 
when “argument is most general and most obviously concerned with values” or what he 
calls “moral public argument” (p. 5).  Therefore, the development of the narrative 
paradigm resulted from this failure of the rational world paradigm.  
 As previously stated, the narrative paradigm goes beyond looking exclusively at 
the logic of human communication.  The narrative paradigm examines the stories 
embedded in discourse (Fisher, 1984, 1985).  “[H]uman communication”, Fisher states, 
“should be viewed as historical as well as situational, as stories competing with other 
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stories constituted by good reasons, as being rational when they satisfy the demands of 
narrative probability and narrative fidelity, and as inevitably moral inducements” (p.2).  
Guiding this view of human communication is the principle that humans are storytellers 
who make decisions based on historically and culturally determined “good reasons” that 
are judged as being rational according to narrative probability and narrative fidelity, and 
these stories and the “good reasons” that support them shape social reality (Fisher, 1984, 
p. 7-8).  From this view of human communication, rhetorical criticism should focus on 
standards of narrative probability and narrative fidelity instead of formal and informal 
logic.  Furthermore, rhetorical criticism is concerned with the features of narrative 
probability and fidelity because these features make “one story better than another” 
(Fisher, 1984, p. 16). 
 Narrative probability refers to the coherence of a story (Fisher, 1984, p. 8).  It is 
“the consistency of characters and actions, the accommodation of auditors, and so on” 
(Fisher, 1984, p. 16).  For Fisher, narrative probability consists of the “formal features” 
of the story, and judgment of a story is determined by how it “‘hangs together’” or 
“whether or not a story is free of contradictions” (1985, p. 349).  More specifically, 
judgments of narrative probability are determined by “coherence, consistency, and 
noncontradiction” and “depend on a comparison and contrast with prior, accepted stories” 
(Fisher, 1985, p. 364).   
 Narrative fidelity asks “whether the stories they experience ring true with the 
stories they know to be true in their lives” (Fisher, 1984, p. 8).  It is “a matter of truth 
according to the doctrine of correspondence” (Fisher, 1984, p. 16).  In other words, how 
is the story consonant with what the audience already knows?  Consonance or narrative 
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fidelity is determined by “the logic of good reasons” (Fisher, 1985, p. 349).  Good 
reasons can include, but is not limited to formal and informal logic (Fisher, 1985, p. 350).  
Good reasons can also include any number of value judgments or an adherence to 
metaphors and myths (Fisher, 1985, p. 350, 357).  Narrative probability and narrative and 
fidelity determine narrative rationality (Fisher, 1984, 1985).  Consequently, critical 
examination of narrative rationality embedded in discourse is essential because “good 
stories function in two ways: to justify (or mystify) decisions or actions already made or 
performed and to determine future decisions or actions” (Fisher, 1985, p. 362). 
Reagan and Narrative Rationality 
According to Lewis (1987), the narrative paradigm is central to understanding 
Reagan’s discourse.  Lewis explains the centrality of narrative to his presidency, 
“Reagan’s message is a story.  Reagan uses story-telling to direct his policies, ground his 
explanations, and inspire his audiences” (1987, p. 281).  In the development of his 
narrative, Reagan tells two types of stories (Lewis, 1987, p. 281).  First, “Anecdotes 
define the character of an issue at the same time that they illustrate, reinforce, and make 
his polices and ideas more vivid” (Lewis, 1987, p. 281-2).  Anecdotes are simple stories 
with a “clear message to those whose experience leads them to accept the story as either 
true or as true-to-life and whose values lead them to accept the moral” (Lewis, 1987, p. 
282).  Second, “Myth structures his message” and “informs all of Reagan’s rhetoric” 
(Lewis, 1987, p. 282).  Myths provide an impetus for action for the individual by telling 
the stories of the origin and destiny of a particular society (Lewis, 1987, p. 282).   
In telling America’s story through the use of anecdotes and myths, Lewis claims 
Reagan’s narrative does the following: 
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Reagan’s story encourages his audience to see America as a chosen nation leading 
the world to freedom and economic progress, to see Reagan as a friendly, well-
motivated leader and as a narrator of the American story, and to see themselves as 
heroes in the unfolding drama of American greatness.  In Reagan’s rhetoric, the 
nature of the world, his policies, his values, his character, and the character of his 
audience are defined together. (Lewis, 1987, p. 287) 
There is a significant consequence to Reagan’s story of America: “Reagan’s exclusive 
and explicit reliance on a single story has dominated the realm of political judgment” 
(Lewis, 1987, p. 288).  In the arena of public policy, Reagan’s narrative rationality has 
prevailed (Lewis, 1987, p 288). 
 Fisher’s (1987) narrative criticism of Reagan’s story is consonant with Lewis’s 
(1987).  “Reagan’s story” Fisher claims, “is grounded in American history and it is 
informed by central values of the American Dream” (1987, p. 146).  Reagan’s character 
“is constituted by this background and renders him virtually immune to ‘rational’ 
criticism” (Fisher, 1987, p. 146).  Reagan’s “implied audience of heroes in his rhetoric is 
efficacious as just about any that one might conceive” (Fisher, 1987, p. 146).   
 According to Fisher (1987), Reagan’s discourse prevails even though it “fails the 
tests of the rational-world paradigm and the tests of narrative fidelity” (p. 155).  In other 
words, Reagan’s discourse does not pass the test of good reasons.  The discourse prevails 
because of the strength of its coherence and consistency “with the story of America”, “his 
character”, and “the compatibility of his image with that of his constituency” (Fisher, 
1987, p. 156).  Furthermore, Fisher argues that Reagan’s discourse “will remain viable as 
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long as historical circumstances permit, as long as there is not an equally compelling 
story and character to confront it and show its ultimate lack of coherence” (1987, p. 156).  
Welfare Reform and Narrative Rationality 
Gring-Pemble (2001) analyzed Congressional hearings and debates concerned 
with welfare reform that led to the passage of PRWORA to gain “insight into the 
rhetorical processes by which social policy is formulated” (p. 342).  Gring-Pemble found 
that narratives of welfare recipients and their families “facilitate elite discourse, 
discourage the inclusion of alternative public views, and delegitimize particular public 
voices” (2001, p. 343).  In other words, the narrative can reify the politics that Fisher 
sought to undermine with his development of narrative rationality (Gring-Pemble, 2001).   
 Specifically, Gring-Pemble claims that the depictions of welfare recipients and 
their families guided judgments of narrative probability and narrative fidelity (2001, p. 
344).  Gring-Pemble (2001) identified “three rhetorical depictions of welfare recipients” 
(p. 347).  First, Gring-Pemble identified “the misfortunate” as “those individuals who 
experience an unexpected misfortune or circumstance and require short-term assistance” 
(2001, p. 347).  Second, Gring-Pemble identified “the feckless” who were depicted as 
having “poor values” and, consequently, “choices prevent the feckless welfare recipient 
from rising out of poverty” (2001, p. 349).  It should be noted, this depiction was the 
dominant depiction in the debates and hearings (Gring-Pemble, 2001, p. 349).  Third, the 
debates and hearings depicted “welfare mothers as predominately immature youth” 
(Gring-Pemble, 2001, p. 353).  From all three of these depictions, policy initiatives 
developed (Gring-Pemble, 2001, p. 355-8, Gring-Pemble, 2003, p. 476). 
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 In another study, Gring-Pemble (2003) notes the pervasiveness and power of 
stories and depictions of welfare recipients during hearings and debates concerned with 
welfare.  In conjunction with disparaging stories and depictions of welfare recipients, 
were anecdotes which support the “Mythical Family Ideal” or the traditional nuclear 
family (Gring-Pemble, 2003, p. 476-7).  These rhetorical constructions served “as 
evidence to support legislative proposals and policies designed to enforce marriage, 
paternal economic support, and material dependence” (Gring-Pemble, 2003, p. 476).  
Throughout the debates, these rhetorical constructions prevailed, despite “significant 
evidence” that ultimately undermined the veracity of the stories, depictions, and 
anecdotes (Gring-Pemble, 2003, p. 490). 
Methodology 
Because of his significance in the history of the welfare policy debate (Asen, 
2002), this study will examine Reagan’s poverty discourse.  More specifically, this study 
will examine the narrative rationality embedded in his poverty discourse.  Because 
judgments of narrative rationality are determined by narrative probability and narrative 
fidelity (Fisher, 1984, 1985), this study will critically examine the coherence of his 
poverty discourse and good reasons that constitute narrative fidelity.  It is important to 
examine the coherence and consistency of the narrative because, as Fisher (1987) 
indicates, the coherence and consistency of Reagan’s narrative are the reasons why his 
narrative prevails.  
 Furthermore, informed by previous research, this study will examine specific 
themes within the narrative of Reagan’s poverty discourse.  From this research, the 
following questions will guide the examination.  First, how does Reagan’s narrative of 
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poverty repudiate the regimes that preceded his presidency?  Second, how does Reagan 
use anecdotes and myths within his narrative of poverty?  Third, does Reagan’s narrative 
of poverty meet standards of narrative probability and narrative fidelity?  Finally, does 
Reagan’s narrative of poverty inform the depictions and anecdotes that led to the passage 
of PRWORA?    
This study will examine all discourse related to poverty and the welfare system in 
the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan.  This will 
include, but is not limited to Reagan’s discourse on poverty and welfare during press 
conferences, speeches before Congress, Inauguration speeches, speeches broadcast on 
television, and any other significant communication relating to poverty and welfare.  The 
texts will be identified by auditing the indexes of the Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States: Ronald Reagan.  However, to limit the number of texts examined, this 
study will only examine discourse related to poverty and the welfare system during 
Reagan’s first four years as president.  This is justifiable because, as Skowronek (1997) 
notes, the presidents construct their narrative in the beginning to set the “parameters of 
politics” (p. 24).  Furthermore, Reagan’s poverty and welfare discourse prior to his taking 
office will not be included.  The purpose of this study is to examine Reagan’s discourse 
as a president.       
The analysis of Reagan’s poverty discourse will develop in the following way: 
First, it will examine Reagan’s story of welfare system and the welfare system in 
justifying his plan for economic recovery.  Second, it will examine Reagan’s story of Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  Third, it will examine Reagan’s poverty 
discourse in justifying his economic policies after the implementation of the plan for 
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economic.  In all of the following chapters, this study will determine whether or not the 
depictions and anecdotes constructed by Reagan were influential to the passage of 
PRWORA; in other words, is Reagan’s rhetorical construction similar to the construction 
described by Gring-Pemble (2001, 2003) and Asen (2002). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Reconstructing Poverty Discourse through Economic Recovery 
 
Reagan’s Proposal on February 18, 1981 
When Reagan first assumed the Office of President he introduced a plan for 
economic recovery.  Reagan outlined and justified his plan for economic recovery in a 
speech on February 18, 1981, before a joint session of Congress and a national television 
and radio audience.  In this speech, Reagan identifies two main economic problems, 
inflation and unemployment, that justify the need for economic recovery to the American 
worker.  First, he identifies “the punishing inflation which has for the first time in 60 
years held to double-digit figures for 2 years in a row” (Reagan, 1982, p. 109).  Reagan 
makes inflation significant to workers with the following anecdote, “One worker in a 
Midwest city put it to me this way: He said, ‘I am bringing home more dollars than I ever 
believed I could possibly earn, but I seem to be getting worse off.’  And he is” (Reagan, 
1982, 109).  This is consistent with Asen’s (2002) claim that Reagan associated himself 
with the “individual worker” (p. 88), but what is additionally important is that Reagan 
specifically implicates inflation as hurting the individual worker.   
 Second, Reagan implicates unemployment as undermining economic growth and 
productivity.  Specifically, he indicates the despair caused by unemployment combined 
with high inflation: 
Almost 8 million Americans are out of work. These are people who want to be 
productive.  But as the months go by, despair dominates their lives.  The threats of 
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layoff and unemployment hang over other millions, and all who work are 
frustrated by their inability to keep up with inflation.  (Reagan, 1982, p. 109) 
Under the scenario presented by Reagan, there are Americans many out of work and 
suffering through no fault of their own, and those that are fortunate to keep a job are hurt 
by the rate of inflation and experience a growing fear of losing their jobs.  Furthermore, 
Reagan explains that these problems have been compounded by the increase in taxes on 
the American family, “Federal personal taxes for the average family have increased 67 
percent” (Reagan, 1982, p. 109) 
By explaining how the American worker is feeling the effects of inflation and 
unemployment, Reagan justifies his plan for economic recovery. He then begins to 
present and justify a four-part plan for economic recovery to solve for the problems of 
inflation and unemployment: 
This plan is aimed at reducing the growth in government and taxing, reforming 
and eliminating regulations which are unnecessary and unproductive or 
counterproductive, and encouraging a consistent monetary policy aimed at 
maintaining the value of currency.  If enacted in full, this program can help 
America create 13 million new jobs, nearly 3 million more than we would have 
without these measures.  It will also help us gain control of inflation.  (Reagan, 
1982, p. 109) 
Because Reagan would call for reduction spending on social program, specifically 
programs that provided benefits for the poor, the following analysis will examine 
Reagan’s rhetorical construction of welfare recipients and the welfare system to support 
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reductions in government spending on social programs within the narrative of economic 
recovery.   
 In justifying the reductions in social spending, in his speech on February 18, 
1981, Reagan made it clear that he would not cut programs that benefited deserving 
individuals.  Specifically, he noted:  
We will continue to fulfill the obligations that spring from our national 
conscience.  Those who, through no fault of their own, must depend on the rest of 
us—the poverty stricken, the disabled, the elderly, all those with true need—can 
rest assured that the social safety net of programs they depend on are exempt from 
any cuts.  (Reagan, 1982, p. 110)   
However, Reagan also makes it clear, “government will not continue to subsidize 
individuals […] where real need cannot be demonstrated” (Reagan, 1982, p. 110).  
Specifically, Reagan claims the government can “save $1.8 billion in fiscal year 1982 by 
removing from eligibility those who are not in real need or who are abusing” the Food 
Stamp program (1982, p. 111).  Reagan also promised to “tighten welfare and give more 
attention to outside sources of income when determining the amount of welfare that an 
individual is allowed” (1982, p. 111), and he would couple this plan with “strong and 
effective work requirements” to save $520 million.     
In other words, individuals that can demonstrate a need are deserving of the social 
safety net already in place, and individuals that cannot demonstrate a need will lose the 
benefits they currently receive.  Therefore, any cut in social programs is automatically 
justified.  If an individual loses his or her benefits as a result of Reagan proposed cuts, 
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then he or she did not the benefits anyway because there was no evidence of a “true 
need” or he or she was abusing the system.   
Additionally, by claiming that recipients of Food Stamps and welfare are 
receiving benefits that are not needed and/or are abusing the programs, Reagan associates 
recipients of government programs to what he calls “the general problem of waste and 
fraud in the Federal Government” (1982, p. 112).  If welfare and Food Stamp recipients 
are receiving benefits they do not need or abusing the programs, then, at the very least, 
they are wasting government appropriations, if not committing fraud.  Moreover, Reagan 
cites one estimate that indicates “that fraud alone may account for anywhere from 1 to 10 
percent—as much as $25 billion of Federal expenditures for social programs” (1982, p. 
112).  In his discussion of waste and fraud, Reagan only mentioned government outlays 
on social program.   
 Lastly, in his presentation of the plan for economic recovery on February 18, 
1981, Reagan employs two significant strategies.  First, he preempts those that would 
challenge his proposal, and second, he explains that what has been done before he came 
to office will fail.  Specifically, Reagan notes: 
I’m sure there’ll be some who raise the old familiar cry, “Don’t touch my 
program; cut somewhere else.” I hope I’ve made it plain that our approach has 
been evenhanded, that only the programs for the truly deserving needy remain 
untouched.  The question is, are we simply going to go down the same path we’ve 
gone down before, carving out one special program here, another special program 
there? (1982, p. 114) 
He continues: 
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The taxing power of government must be used to provide revenues for legitimate 
government purposes.  It must not be used to regulate the economy or bring about 
social change.  We’ve tried that, and surely we must be able to see that it doesn’t 
work. (Reagan, 1982, p. 114) 
These strategies are significant, because as Skowronek (1997) claims, before a president 
can use the political power given to him, he must construct a narrative that first explains 
what has been done before and what he proposes to do, and the narrative must preempt 
any challenges to the president’s authority (p. 24).  Reagan situates himself in poverty 
discourse by claiming previous poverty policies to create social change have failed; 
therefore, cuts to what he feels are failed social programs are justified.  He also situates 
himself in poverty discourse by preempting challenges to his authority, by claiming he 
will not cut programs for the truly needy.  This narrative is particularly effective because, 
as Skowronek (1997) notes Reagan could claim the authority and power of the politics of 
reconstruction (p. 414).   
 As Fisher (1987) notes, the strength of Reagan’s entire narrative is its coherence 
and consistency or narrative probability (p. 155-6).  The coherence and consistency of his 
plan for economic recovery is strong as well.  Reagan explains the crisis facing the 
individual worker and American family.  Workers are negatively affected by inflation 
and unemployment.  These adverse conditions are compounded by the increasing tax 
burden on the American family.  The individual worker and the American family are 
innocent victims of current economic conditions.  To end this victimization, Reagan 
proposes a plan for economic recovery.  Central to this plan is cutting government 
spending, specifically spending on social programs.  This new approach is needed 
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because the old ones have failed.  Cutting these programs is justified for two reasons.  
First, social programs are responsible for waste and fraud in the Federal Government.  
Second, only those that either do not need the programs or abuse the programs will be 
affected.  In Reagan’s narrative of economic recovery, the non-needy and the abusers of 
government programs are the culprits.  The narrative is coherent because it has victims, 
victimizers, and a new way to end the victimization.  Moreover, by pitting one group 
against another, welfare recipients become the scapegoat for economic problems, and the 
welfare system (social spending) becomes the sacrificial lamb in the story of economic 
recovery.  
 However, despite the coherence of the narrative of economic recovery and the 
role of welfare recipients and the welfare system within the narrative, the role of the 
recipients and the role of the system as culprits would be subject to challenge.  In other 
words, the narrative meets standards of probability, but it is not clear that the narrative 
meets standards of narrative fidelity.  This is evidenced by Reagan having to defend the 
logic of the cutting social programs in the plan for economic recovery.   
Responding to Challenges 
 In a question-and-answer session on the plan for economic recovery on February 
19, 1981, Reagan defends reduction in spending on social programs, specifically welfare.  
Drawing from his experience as Governor of California, Reagan again implicates the 
welfare in weakening the economy:  
[P]art of my confidence in […] what we can do is based on what we did in 
California.  We finally realized that all the savings we were making, all the 
 19
economies, were all being eaten by welfare.  And in good times and bad it bore no 
relation to the economy.  
 We saw that welfare in California was reaching a point of an increase of as 
much as 40,000 cases a month being added to the welfare rolls.  We finally turned 
the task force loose to come back with a plan for reforming welfare. (Reagan, 
1982, p. 135) 
Reagan continues by implicating the welfare system and its inability to determine the 
actual number of people on welfare:  
[N]o one in the United States knows how many people are on welfare.  They only 
know how many checks they’re sending out, and then we turn up a woman in 
Chicago that’s getting checks under 127 different names.  And just recently in 
Pasadena, California, living in a lovely home there, a woman was brought in and 
charged with collecting $300,000 in a welfare scheme. (Reagan, 1982, p. 135) 
In defending reductions in spending on social programs, Reagan clearly uses an anecdote.  
As stated earlier, anecdotes are simple stories with a “clear message to those whose 
experience leads them to accept the story as either true or as true-to-life and whose values 
lead them to accept the moral” (Lewis, 1987, p. 282).  Again, anecdotes define the nature 
of an issue (Lewis, 1987, p. 281-2).  In this scenario, Reagan tells a story that defines 
nature of the welfare system and welfare recipients and justifies retrenchment of the 
welfare system.  The welfare system disrupts economies and is fundamentally flawed; it 
is so flawed that individuals are able to cheat the system.   
 Reagan goes further to justify welfare reform by explain the success he had in 
reforming welfare in California:  
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[W]e saved over a 3-year period, because the welfare reforms went in only in my 
last 3 years—we saved $2 billion for the California tax-payers in the program.  
The rolls were reduced by more than 350,000 people without us actually throwing 
anyone off.  They just disappeared, and over and above that we had enough to 
increase the welfare grants to the deserving needy who remained by an average of 
43 percent. (Reagan, 1982, p. 136) 
Again, using this anecdote from his experience accomplishes four things.  First, by 
explaining how reforming the program saved California taxpayers billions, Reagan 
clarifies how individuals receiving public assistance hurt the individual worker.  In other 
words, Reagan provides specific evidence of the welfare recipient hurting the individual 
worker.  Second, the anecdote implies that mismanagement and abuse is widespread in 
the welfare system.  By stating that the individuals just disappeared, Reagan implies that 
individuals could have been receiving more than one check and that without reform, the 
welfare system is unable determine who is receiving the checks.  Third, reforming and 
reducing welfare does not hurt the truly needy.  Reform freed funds for the truly needy.  
Fourth, and most important, it suggests that welfare reform is successful, achievable, and 
humane.  Reform and reductions in social spending have worked in the past and these 
previous reforms did not hurt what Reagan calls the “deserving needy”.  Again, Reagan 
tells an anecdote based on his experience that defines and characterizes reductions in 
social spending as a sound and humane policy that is central to economic recovery.   
 In a news conference on March 6, 1981, when asked how poor people will survive 
the cuts in social spending, Reagan again used almost the same anecdote based on his 
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experience as Governor of California; however this time he indicates that the reduction 
was due to cheaters being caught:  
We never had a single case of anyone suddenly appearing and saying, “I am 
destitute. I’ve been cut off welfare.” As a matter of face, most of those people 
disappeared of their own free will, which led us to believe that under regulations 
which bound us in our administrative ability, we were unable to really pin down 
how many people might be getting more than one welfare check.  And when they 
just disappeared as the spotlight began to be turned on, possibly out of recognition 
that they were now going to be caught, the rolls just shrank.  And it’s this theory 
that’s behind what we are doing.  (Reagan, 1982, p. 208) 
Again, Reagan is able to uses the anecdote to “illustrate, reinforce, and make his polices 
and ideas more vivid” (Lewis, 1987, p. 281-2).  Additionally, as Asen (2002) notes, 
“Reagan construed this silence as irrefutable proof” (p. 97).  If anyone is hurt by the 
policies of the administration, it is the individuals that hurt the system and the individual 
worker.  
 Reagan would employ this anecdote again in a question-and-answer session with 
Congressional Women on the plan for economic recovery on March 16, 1981.  
Representative Cardiss Collins of Illinois expressed reservations about the spending cuts, 
“But I’m very concerned about those people who are recipients of AFDC, who are 
children that cannot speak out for themselves” (Reagan, 1982, p. 251).  Reagan told the 
story of the success in California; however this time he added:  
And I think you’re going to find that—well, I have to say that I think that some of 
the purveyors of these programs, the dispensers of the programs are more worried 
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about losing their position than they are about the people they represent.  And 
they’re trying to create an image that we are picking on the poor, because they 
don’t want to lose their clientele and possibly their position. (Reagan, 1982, p. 
251) 
Reagan extends on the anecdote by characterizing those that decry the administration’s 
policies as individuals that are not poor that are afraid of losing their job.  In other words, 
this addition to the anecdote casts doubt on the credibility of those that oppose cuts in 
social spending.   
Assessing Narrative Fidelity in Reagan’s Response 
 Reagan was able to get the reduction in Federal spending that he wanted.  On 
September 24, 1981, Reagan again spoke to the about his plan for economic recovery to a 
national television and radio audience.  Reagan noted that a “bipartisan coalition” had 
enacted the “greatest reduction in Federal spending in our nation’s history” (Reagan, 
1982, p. 831).  Ultimately, Reagan’s discourse was successful in that legislators passed a 
large reduction in Federal spending which was part of the plan for economic recovery.  
However, does this mean that Reagan’s narrative passes the “logic of good reasons”?   
 Again, the anecdote served to make Reagan’s policy more vivid; however, it is 
important to note that the anecdote functions by creating specific depictions.  First, the 
California case is depicted as a success to the taxpayer and the “deserving needy”.  In the 
anecdote, the strategy in California worked.  Second, the California anecdote depicted a 
welfare system in which waste was prevalent before reforms were made.  Third, the 
California anecdote depicted welfare recipients as cheats and frauds.  Fourth, the 
anecdote depicts those that question the rationality of cutting social spending as 
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government officials that are afraid of losing their jobs and do not have a real concern for 
the people that receive assistance. The depictions in the California anecdote presented by 
Reagan serve as “good reasons” for the reduction in welfare.  As Gring-Pemble (2001) 
notes, “depictions serve as evidence for audiences to determine both narrative probability 
and narrative fidelity” (p. 344).  Additionally, by referencing the case in California, 
Reagan is able to establish the “truth according to the doctrine of correspondence” 
(Fisher, 1984, p. 16).  The measures to be taken in the plan for economic recovery 
correspond with what Reagan claims to be the successful California case. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Reagan was able to reconstruct poverty discourse through his plan for economic 
recovery.  As Asen (2002) notes, the end of the 1970s “saw the end of the post-war boom 
that threatened the economic standing of many Americans previously propelled into 
prosperity by this very boom” (p. 71).  Aware of this, Reagan proposed a plan for 
economic recovery.  The narrative of economic recovery presented by Reagan had clear 
victims (the individual worker) and clear perpetrators (government spending, specifically 
spending on programs that does not serve the “truly needy”).   
 This narrative was challenged because of a fear that those currently receiving 
public assistance would lose their benefits and become destitute.  However, Reagan 
responded to this challenge by presenting an anecdote of the California case which 
included the depictions necessary to meet the “doctrine of correspondence” and the “logic 
of good reasons”, because the depictions implicated the undeserving poor.  Reagan was 
able to meet the standards of narrative probability and narrative fidelity.   
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 It is significant to note that there was not a challenge to implicating social 
spending on the whole as the culprit for decreased economic growth.  It is quite possible 
that this is a result of Reagan’s power to repudiate the policies of the past.  Reagan was 
able to link social spending to the failed policies of the past.  Because Reagan was the 
beneficiary of the politics of reconstruction, he was not challenged on his power to 
reshape political order.   
On September 24, 1981, Reagan also called for “additional reductions in Federal 
spending that will help lower out interest rates, our inflation, and bring us closer to full 
economic recovery” (Reagan, 1982, p. 831).  This reduction in Federal spending would 
include “a new package of entitlement and welfare reform measures” (Reagan, 1982, p. 
833), and again, Reagan justified the reform measures by presenting the anecdote of his 
experience with the California welfare system and stressed, “We can be compassionate 
about human needs without being complacent about budget extravagance” (Reagan, 
1982, p. 834).  Not only did he justify the cuts with California anecdote, but he justified 
future cuts with the same anecdote, preempting any challenges.  The anecdote had 
become a stock rhetorical strategy in reducing welfare.   
  Additionally, within Reagan’s narrative of economic recovery, he identifies 
“[t]hose who, through no fault of their own must depend on the rest of us—the poverty 
stricken” (1982, p. 110).  This statement indicates a link between Reagan’s depiction of 
the poor and depictions of the identified by Gring-Pemble (2001).   Specifically, 
legislators during the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996 (PRWORA) debates constructed an image of the “misfortunate welfare 
recipient” that faced “unanticipated circumstances outside of their control such as 
 25
personal disasters” (Gring-Pemble, 2001, p. 347-8).  Regan’s depiction of the individuals 
deserving public assistance and the “misfortunate” depiction during the PRWORA 
debates both viewed some recipients of public assistance as deserving the benefits they 
received. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
Reconstructing Poverty Discourse through Federalism Legislation 
 
 Reagan also reconstructs poverty through Federalism legislation that proposed to 
have State governments assume control of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) and the food stamps program in exchange for the Federal Government assume 
control of Medicaid.  Although this proposal failed to reach the Congressional floor, his 
presentation of the proposal to exchange AFDC and food stamp program with Medicaid 
altered poverty discourse.  It made poverty a local concern, which influenced the welfare 
legislation in the mid-1990s, and his discourse would pit spending on social programs 
against national defense.   
State of the Union Address January 26, 1982 
 In his State of the Union Address on January 26, 1982, Reagan continues his 
efforts to reshape political order. The first phase of reshaping political order was to 
increase economic growth through the plan for economic recovery.  The second phase of 
reshaping political order was to give control of federal programs to state governments.  
First, Reagan restates the importance of his plan for economic recovery in simulating 
growth and protecting the “truly needy”, “the economic program we’ve put into operation 
will protect the needy while it triggers a recovery that will benefit all Americans” 
(Reagan, 1983a, p.75).  Second, Reagan states the next phase in reshaping political order, 
“our next major undertaking must be a program—just as bold, just as innovative—to 
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make government accountable to the people, to make our system of federalism work 
again” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 75).   
 In proposing this new legislation, Reagan explains how the federal government 
and control has become extremely excessive:  
Our citizens feel they’ve lost control of even the most basic decisions made about 
essential services of government, such as schools, welfare, roads, and even 
garbage collection.  And they’re right.  A maze of interlocking jurisdictions and 
levels of government confronts average citizens in trying to solve even the 
simplest of problems.  They don’t know where to turn for answers, who to hold 
accountable, who to praise, who to blame, who to vote against.  The main reason 
for this is the overpowering growth of Federal grants-in-aid programs during the 
past few decades. (Reagan, 1983a, p. 75) 
In this passage, Reagan tells a story in which the “average citizen” mired in a system of 
government where needs cannot be met.  Additionally, “Federal grant-in-aid programs” 
become the culprit for the pinch felt by the “average citizen”.  
 Earlier in the speech, Reagan indicated that the priority of Federal Government is 
maintaining two things: “a strong national defense” and “a reliable safety net of social 
programs” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 74).  Reagan explains how trying to oversee the grants-in-
aid programs interfere with these priorities:  
You know and I know that neither the President nor the Congress can properly 
oversee this jungle of grants-in-aid; indeed, the growth of these grants has led to 
the distortion in the vital functions of government.  As one Democratic Governor 
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put it recently: The National Government should be worrying about “arms 
control, not pot holes.” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 76) 
In Reagan’s narrative of the problems of increased federal control interferes with national 
priorities outline by Reagan.  The fundamental national priorities, the President, and 
Congress are all victims of the grants-in-aid program.  These reasons justify Reagan’s 
plan to “return some $47 billion in Federal programs to State and local government,” 
(Reagan, 1983a, p. 76).   
 Fundamental to the legislation is a swap of programs between the Federal 
Government and state governments:  
Starting in fiscal 1984, the Federal Government will assume full responsibility for 
the cost of the rapidly growing Medicaid program to go along with its existing 
responsibility for Medicare.  As part of the financially equal swap, the States will 
simultaneously take full responsibility for Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children and food stamps.  This will make welfare less costly and more 
responsive to genuine need, because it’ll be designed and administered closer to 
the grassroots and people it serves. (Reagan, 1983a, p. 76) 
By federalizing Medicaid and devolving AFDC and food stamps, Reagan essentially 
places the AFDC and food stamps outside the realm of national and/or federal priorities.  
It also places the recipients and beneficiaries of these programs outside the realm of 
national priority.  
 Reagan’s narrative of federalism in the State of the Union Address describes a 
system that is out of control.  The Federal Government has assumed responsibility for too 
many programs.  The “average citizen”, national priorities (national defense and the 
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safety net of social programs), Congress, and the President are all negatively affect by 
this system that is out of control.  Getting the Federal Government back to its national 
priorities is to devolve control of AFDC and food stamps to the states because the states 
would be best at administering these programs.  Again, Reagan advances a narrative that 
has clear victims and clear culprits (grants-in-aid programs, specifically AFDC and food 
stamps).   
By advancing a narrative with clear victims and culprits, the story “hangs 
together” (1985, p. 349) with “consistency of characters” (Fisher, 1984, p. 16); therefore, 
the story meets the standard of narrative probability.  Furthermore, the probability of this 
narrative is enhanced by two factors.  First, it is consistent with the “prior, accepted” 
story (Fisher, 1985, p. 364) of economic recovery.  Giving the states responsibility of 
AFDC and food stamps is consistent with plan for economic recovery’s goals to reduce 
federal spending and regulations.  Second, Reagan enhances the coherence of the story by 
explaining that he will propose the plan to Congress “only after close consultation with 
congressional, State, and local officials” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 76).  This adds to the 
coherence of the narrative because it gives state and local governments a say in the 
legislation, rather than the having the Federal Government pass legislation without 
concern for the state and local government.  By consulting with state and local 
government, Reagan is already giving some power back to the states.  
 Because Reagan would only propose Federalism legislation to Congress after 
consulting state and local governments, this chapter will examine the speeches Reagan 
made to various state and local governments that makes the case to devolve AFDC and 
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food stamps.  The subsequent section will assess the narrative fidelity and reassess the 
narrative probability of Reagan’s Federalism proposal.  
Presenting the Proposal at the State and Local Levels 
 In an interview with reporters in Bloomington, Minnesota, on the Federalism 
proposal, on February 8, 1982, reporters question the workability of the Federalism 
program and the burden it will place on the states (Reagan, 1983a, p. 142).  Reagan 
responds and justifies the rationale of the plan:  
There are going to be no winners and no losers in this.  We’re going to transfer 
the funds that are necessary to perform the programs.  And the trade that we 
proposed, of the Federal Government taking Medicaid and in return them taking 
food stamps and the Aid to Dependent Children, was because the increase in 
spending on Medicaid is several times greater than the increase in those other 
programs. So, the Federal Government, by taking that program on, is going to 
relieve the States of an increased burden (Reagan, 1983a, p. 142) 
In Reagan’s response, the proposal is no longer a financially equal swap.  The Federal 
Government will be relieving the States of a burden.  The States would benefit from the 
proposal; however, this seems to contradict the statement that there are no “winners” or 
“losers”.  The consistency and coherence of the narrative begins to wane in presenting the 
case to the states.  
 The reporters in Bloomington continued to question the workability of the 
program and explained that Republicans in Congress disagreed with the claim of a 
“financially equal swap”.  In response, Reagan claims, “Well, I don’t think they fully 
understand yet” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 142).  He justifies the proposal again, “we have been 
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meeting already with Governors, mayors, and so forth […] this is something that for 30 
years they’ve been begging for” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 142).  Moreover, Reagan denounces 
naysayers as “Members of Congress who resist giving up authority and power” (Reagan, 
1983a, p. 143).  Again, the strength of the coherence of the narrative falters.  In the State 
of the Union Address, Congress was a victim of the growth of the Federal Government.  
In this scenario, the willingness of members of Congress to support the Federalism 
proposal is a result of their desire for authority; they are now also culprits.   
 Speaking before the Iowa State Legislature on February 9, 1982, Reagan explains 
how federal authority has usurped local authority in areas of “fire protection, police 
pensions, welfare, and pothole repair” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 145).  Again, Reagan stresses 
working with local and state governments, specifically the Iowa State Legislature, to 
develop a plan “to restore accountability now missing in our bloated government” 
(Reagan, 1983a, p. 146).  Additionally, he states, “the centerpiece of the proposal is the 
almost dollar-for-dollar swap of two of the largest areas of welfare”, Medicaid and AFDC 
and the food stamp program (Reagan, 1983a, p. 146).  In two days, Reagan tells two 
different stories about the swap between federal and state government.  The first story has 
the Federal Government relieving the states of a financial burden.  The second story has a 
“dollar-for-dollar swap” between the two levels of government.  At this point, the 
narrative of Reagan’s Federalism proposal has inconsistencies, damaging narrative 
probability.  
 Additionally, in his speech to the Iowa State Legislature, Reagan continues to 
denounce those in Congress that oppose his proposal.  However, this time he claims that 
they are the same individuals that denounced the plan for economic recovery:  
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First the elitists fought the tax cuts, saying the American people could not be 
trusted with an increased share of their own earnings.  Now they say the people 
we elect to State and local office can’t be trusted to run State and local affairs.  
Well then, who can we trust? A handful of individuals with a strong case of 
Potomac fever, the very individuals who got us into this mess to begin with? 
(Reagan, 1983a, p. 147) 
In this passage is a clear depiction of those opposing Reagan’s reforms, first, Reagan’s 
opponents do not trust the American people.  Second, Reagan’s opponents do not trust 
local governments to handle local problems.  Third, Reagan’s opponents should not be 
trusted because they are culpable for the current crisis.  Again, this contradicts the story 
in which Congress is a victim told in the State of the Union Address.   
 In a speech to the Indiana State Legislature, also on February 9, 1982, Reagan 
again denounces those that oppose his reforms as having their own political agenda, and 
responds to the challenge they present: 
[T]here are those who for their own narrow political purposes say our federalism 
plan is a mere diversion from our economic problems, or that federalism is simply 
a means to cut the budget further.  Well, don’t you believe it.  Our federalism plan 
stands on its own merits, a key to a freer, better America.  Federalism is too 
important an issue to be treated as a distraction (Reagan, 1983a, p. 155) 
Reagan continues and justifies the federalism proposal with an Indiana-specific 
metaphor, “The concept of federalism is like the green and gold quilt of Indiana crops.  
There is protection in variety.  Well, there’s protection in the quilt of the 50 States as 
well” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 156).   
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 Reagan also presents his plan to swap control of Medicaid with AFDC and food 
stamps, but this time he again proposes it as a plan that benefits states, “The States will 
be picking up the areas where growth is much less rapid.  Under current law, the total 
funding for AFDC and food stamps by 1987 compared with a projected 83-percent 
increase in the total cost of Medicaid for the same period” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 156).  In 
this scenario, the Federal Government will assume financial burden of “the most rapidly 
growing social domestic needs” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 156).  This story of the swap is not 
“dollar-for-dollar”.  
 In remarks made at the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors’ Town Meeting 
on March 3, 1982, Reagan again describes the swap as “the centerpiece of the federalism 
initiative” and claims it to be “almost dollar-for-dollar” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 259).  
However, in the same speech, Reagan states that AFDC and the food stamp program 
“will grow at only about one-sixth the rate of the cost of Medicaid” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 
259).  Moreover, Reagan explains, “Our federalism program will have no losers. This is 
not an attempt to dump anything on the States and local governments”, and continues his 
denouncement of those “who suggest that State and local government can’t handle the 
responsibility” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 259).  On the other hand, by having the Federal 
Government assume full responsibility of the cost of the larger Medicaid program, one 
could infer that Reagan does believe state and local government cannot handle the 
responsibility.  Even if one does not infer this, there is still an inconsistency problem in 
Reagan’s narrative.   
 In a speech to the Alabama State Legislature March 15, 1982, Reagan again 
implies that he is relieving the states of the burden of the “rapidly growing Medicaid 
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program in exchange for the States picking up Aid to Families with Families with 
Dependent Children and food stamps” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 293).  While this is 
inconsistent with the “dollar-for-dollar” swap story told earlier, it is also inconsistent with 
the evidence Reagan presented in the speech to justify the Federalism proposal:  
David Broder of the Washington Post has said “… the contrast between the 
stumbling of the National Government and the improving performance of State 
and local government is a largely unreported story.  Individual States have moved 
out ahead of the Federal Government ahead of the Federal Government, justifying 
again their claim to be ‘laboratories of democracy.’” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 293) 
This is a compelling argument for giving state government more control and autonomy.  
However, the argument portrays the Federal Government as “stumbling”, which is not 
necessarily an endorsement of the Federal Government assuming full financial 
responsibility of a “rapidly growing” program.    
 Speaking before the Tennessee State Legislature, also March 15, 1982, again 
explains how the “Federal Government has become so bloated and fat that [‘Tennessee 
volunteer’ Andrew] Jackson wouldn’t recognize it” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 297).  In 
explaining how this occurs Reagan says, “In the last 10 years, Federal spending has 
increased more than 300 percent […] Medicaid and Medicare have gone up by more than 
500 percent.  Food stamps, in 15 years, have increased by 16,000 percent” (Reagan, 
1983a, p. 298).  These reasons justify the need for the Federalism proposal and what 
Reagan again calls the “centerpiece of the proposal [….] the almost dollar-for-dollar” 
swap of Medicaid for AFDC and food stamps (Reagan, 1983a, p. 298).  In this scenario, 
with the reasons provided, the Federal Government would assume full financial 
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responsibility of a historically slower growing program.  In this speech, Reagan did not 
state that the Federal Government would be relieving the states of a financial burden of 
the “rapidly growing” Medicaid.  
 The next day, in a speech delivered to the Oklahoma State Legislature, Reagan 
explains, “Our federalism plan is not airtight or infallible; it is designed to serve as a 
basis for discussion.  We can certainly work out the details and meet the concerns that 
you may have” (Reagan, 1983a).  While Reagan did state in the State of the Union 
Address that he would only make a proposal after he consulted others (specifically State 
and local governments and officials), by relegating the proposal to a “basis of discussion” 
Reagan cedes much of his power to reshape poverty policy through federalism.  
Additionally, by claiming that the proposal is “not airtight or infallible” the narrative 
becomes less cohesive.  Opposition to the proposal is justified because even the 
individual that presented it concedes that it could have mistakes.  
 The plan to swap control of Medicaid with AFDC and food stamps changed. 
Speaking at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Counties in Baltimore, 
Maryland, on July, 13, 1982, Reagan states:  
I have consulted with State and local officials as well as Members of the Congress 
[…] While we’ve remained true to our first principles, significant changes have 
been made.  The new package calls for Federal assumption of Medicaid 
responsibilities in return for State takeover of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children.  But the food stamp program has been dropped from the swap. (Reagan, 
1983b, p. 920) 
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Reagan also makes it clear that the change was due to opposition to and concern with the 
original proposal; he states that the changes “go along toward answering your needs” 
(Reagan, 1983b, p. 920).   
Reassessing Narrative Probability and Narrative Fidelity 
 At a purely instrumental level of analysis of Reagan’s narrative of federalism, the 
story of devolving control of AFDC and the food stamp program failed.  On February 23, 
1983, in a Message to Congress Transmitting Proposed Federalism Legislation, Reagan 
states, “The swap of federalization of Medicaid for State assumption of AFDC and Food 
Stamps, which was included in my January, 1982 framework has been dropped from the 
package” (Reagan, 1984a, p. 300).  As the Washington Post reports, the plan “includes 
only $21 billion in programs compared with the $47 billion program proposed last year” 
(Williams, 1983 p. A3). The swap was not even sent to Congress.  Why did the story fail 
at this level, especially if the proposal in the State of the Union was coherent? This 
question can be answered by reassessing the narrative probability and assessing narrative 
fidelity.   
Especially important in determining narrative fidelity is “whether or not a story is 
free of contradictions” (1985, p. 349).  In the State of the Union Address, the Reagan 
claims that Congress is a victim of the growth of the Federal Government because the 
growth made it impossible for the members to oversee the extensive legislation.  
However, after the plan was proposed, the Washington Post reported that Congress 
Members “strongly criticized” the plan because “it gave authority to local governments 
without providing sufficient funds” (Williams, 1983, p. A3).  Reagan responded by 
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denouncing the opposition as individuals that only wanted to maintain their own power 
and as individuals that did not trust the average American, let alone local governments. 
The Washington Post also reported that “local officials” had registered many of 
the same complaints made by Congresspersons (Williams, 1983, p. A3).  In the State of 
the Union, Reagan presented the swap as “financially equal” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 76).  
When complaints were made about a lack of funding, Reagan decided to explain the 
proposal as a way to relieve a burden that was placed on the State and local government 
because the Federal Government would assume responsibility of the “rapidly growing” 
Medicaid.  State governments would assume the cost and responsibility of the less 
expansive AFDC and food stamp programs.  If Medicaid is expect to grow more rapidly, 
how could the swap be “financially equal”?  The coherence of the story becomes lost.  
Moreover, when the swap is framed this way, the already expansive Federal Government, 
as Reagan claims, is going to assume control of the more expansive of the two programs.  
This is inconsistent with the goal of the proposal.   
The story lacks the “coherence, consistency, and noncontradiction” necessary for 
a story to achieve narrative probability (Fisher, 1985, p. 364).  Reagan’s rhetorical 
choices in response to opposition and realistic concerns in proposing to swap 
responsibilities of Medicaid, AFDC, and the food stamp program doomed the policy 
initiative, despite the coherence of the narrative presented in the State of the Union.  
While the victims and actions in the narrative failed to “hang together”, the justification 
for action remained a strong point of the story.  The justification was, for the most part, 
consistent with Reagan’s accepted story of economic recovery in that the plan sought to 
limit the expansion of the federal government, the enemy of the economy in the previous 
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story.  However, the consistency with accepted story of would undermine the narrative 
fidelity of the story.   
 As stated earlier, narrative fidelity asks: How is the story consonant with what the 
audience already knows?  What does the audience already know?  If the narrative of 
economic recovery is true, or at least regarded as accurate enough to pass legislation, then 
the audience knows at least two things about welfare.  First, in the narrative of economic 
recovery, welfare programs, including AFDC and the food stamp program, are wrought 
with mismanagement.  Agencies are unable to determine who is actually receiving the 
benefits of these programs.  Second, many of the recipients of these benefits are the non-
needy or cheaters that are bilking the programs.  Even though the cuts to these programs 
were enacted, Reagan gives no indication that the mismanagement and fraud has ceased.  
Therefore, in Reagan’s story of federalism legislation, he was essentially asking states to 
assume responsibility and funding of programs plagued by the problems of fraud and 
mismanagement.   
 The “logic of good reasons” also falters in another way.  As the Washington Post 
reports, the plan proposed by Reagan in February of 1983, “includes only $21 billion in 
programs compared with the $47 billion program he proposed last year” (Williams, 1983, 
p. A3).  If the Federal government was going to devolve programs to the States to save 
$47 billion, then the States would have to either absorb the costs, or the programs.  
Again, this was the cause of complaint for local officials and members of Congress.  
Even though Reagan claimed the Federal Government would assume responsibility of the 
“rapidly growing” program, Medicaid, States would still have to pay for AFDC and the 
food stamp programs.  Because Medicaid will grow faster than AFDC and food stamp 
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programs does not mean that AFDC and food stamps will be less costly, especially in the 
short term.  Furthermore, in his proposal, Reagan justified scaling back federal programs 
with evidence that indicates food stamps have historically increased faster than Medicaid.  
Reagan gives no indication of how the “dollar-for-dollar” swap will benefit the States.  
This is reinforced by Reagan’s claim that the proposal is not “infallible”.  State assuming 
responsibility of programs characterized as having fraud and mismanagement with no 
financial benefit does not fall into the category of “good reasons”.  
Reagan’s narrative of Federalism Legislation to swap Medicaid with AFDC and 
food stamps fails does not pass the test of “good reasons” in some other ways.  First, 
when he spoke to the Indiana State Legislature, Reagan indicated that turning programs 
over to the states means greater protection, but he does not elaborate on what this means.  
Second, when speaking to the Alabama State Legislature, he indicated that states are 
“‘laboratories of democracy’”, but handing states AFDC and the food stamp programs is 
not the same as states having the freedom to experiment with different programs to see 
what works.  Again, states would be handed broken programs, according to Reagan’s 
characterization of them in the narrative of economic recovery.   
Summary and Conclusions 
Even though this particular narrative of swapping AFDC with Medicaid fails tests 
of narrative probability and narrative fidelity and was omitted from the Federalism 
proposal, the failed narrative did work to reconstruct poverty discourse in two significant 
ways.  First, it characterized welfare and, correspondingly poverty, as a local concern or 
problem.  Reagan put welfare on the same level as clearly local issues like garbage 
collection.  Moreover, by associating welfare with garbage collection and pot holes, the 
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narrative trivializes the nature of poverty.  Poverty is put on the same level of concern as 
whether or not garbage is collected on time or properly.  The Federal Government is 
absolved from the responsibility of providing assistance to the poor.  Again, criticisms of 
the initiative were based on financial burdens the States would assume, not on the role of 
the Federal Government in providing for the poor.  Additionally, even if welfare is a local 
concern for State and local governments and poverty better solved by those institutions, 
by asking the local governments to control programs that have been characterized a 
broken and/or failed, there is no real debate or discussion on who can best provide for the 
poor.  
 Additionally, while States did not assume control of AFDC, as Gring-Pemble 
(2001) discussed, the result of welfare legislation in 1996 was the replacement of AFDC 
with a “lump-sum payment (block grant) to states to create state-based welfare programs. 
This block grant became known as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)” 
(p. 347).  In 1996 states did gain control of welfare systems with funding from the 
Federal Government.  Therefore, the idea of state and local control of welfare advocated 
by Reagan was eventually adopted, but the TANF program provided the Federal funding 
that was the major point of contention in his Federalism proposal.    
Second, by claiming that grants-in-aid programs, specifically AFDC and food 
stamps, interfere with the Federal Government’s focus and spending on national defense, 
Reagan can justify a policy of less butter and more guns.  In Reagan’s narrative, 
assistance for the poor and other Federal programs is at odds with national defense.  
Reagan’s narrative of Federal legislation created the perception of zero-sum relationship 
between social spending/focus, specifically spending on the poor, and defense 
 41
spending/focus.  Again, even if this is true, there was not a discussion.  The opposition to 
the narrative rested entirely on the financial burden left to the states.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
Reconstructing Poverty Discourse through Justification of Economic Policies  
  
 In a question-and-answer session with reporters at a Fiscal Year 1983 budget 
signing ceremony on February 9, 1982, Reagan foreshadows his economic priorities after 
the implementation of the plan for economic recovery.  Specifically, he explains the 
program will “try and bring government spending back in line with government’s 
revenues” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 119).  Cutting social spending will be central to achieving 
Reagan’s goals, just as it was in the original proposal for economic recovery.  Again, 
Reagan explains that the “programs are intended to direct the help toward the truly 
needy,” and “to tighten up administrative procedures wherein people who do not have 
real need have enjoyed the benefits of these programs” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 119).   Reagan 
uses some new and old stories to justify this strategy.   
Denouncing the Opposition 
 In the same question-and-session, Reagan responds to reporters who note stories 
presented by Democrats that claim that the poor are suffering and will suffer from his 
economic policies.  He explains why these stories are appearing:  
In times such as this—and I had previous experience as Governor with this 
happening—there are those out there in government […] who will, if possible, 
sabotage and deliberately penalize some individual who actually is not supposed 
to be penalized in order to get a story indicating that the programs are not 
working. (Reagan, 1983a, p. 119) 
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Again, Reagan employs an anecdote from his experience as Governor of California, but 
in this instance, he argues that the welfare bureaucracy will try to make reform look bad.  
By doing so, Reagan leads the audience to believe the story he tells is true.  At the same 
time, it defines the nature of stories that compete with his.  In other words, Reagan 
through the use of this anecdote Reagan claims that the horror stories of the opposition 
are the result of the welfare bureaucracy.  
This story is enhanced by repetitive characterizations or depictions of the 
opposition.  In a news conference on March 31, 1982, Reagan refers to the opposition as 
“special-interest groups who have various [sic] of these programs as their particular 
interest” (Reagan, 1983a, p. 403).  In other words, in Reagan’s narrative, the opposition 
has interests of their own in mind, not fiscal responsibility.  
Reagan’s depiction of the opposition becomes even more inflammatory and 
repetitive.  Reagan repeatedly refers to individuals or groups that claim the economic 
programs are hurting the poor as engaging in “political demagoguery” (Reagan, 1984b, p. 
1338, 1643; 1985a, p. 463; 1985b, p. 1805).  In Reagan’s narrative of the opposition, all 
claims of the unfairness of the policies were “begun and founded in or based in political 
demagoguery” (Reagan, 1984b, p. 1338).  Moreover, the claims are “the most glaring 
example of political demagoguery” (Reagan, 1985a, p. 463), have “no facts” (Reagan 
1984b, 1338), and are made “for political purposes” (Regan, 1984a, p. 1643).  In other 
words, the claims of the opposition are without credibility and are not made because they 
represent the truth or because the individuals making the claims have a concern for the 
poor.  In Reagan’s view and story, the opposition is using unwarranted claims to pander 
to the emotions of the audience. 
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Furthermore, if anyone in government was responsible for the poverty, it was the 
opposition and previous administration.  At Republican Party rally in Omaha, Nebraska, 
on October 21, 1982, Reagan stated, “In 1980 government was growing like toadstools 
after a rainstorm, spinning out of control like a washing machine that was out of cycle.  
Washington and the bureaucracy were growing fatter and fatter while they were making 
everyone poorer and poorer” (Reagan, 1983b, p. 1367).  In his narrative of the 
opposition, government was getting richer, while the poor were getting poorer; therefore, 
in denouncing the opposition, Reagan is able justify the need to reduce spending.  He 
even notes the “trillion-dollar debt” caused by the opposition (Reagan, 1983b, p. 1367). 
Criminalizing the Poor 
 In justifying his economic policies, Reagan claims that poor people are engaging 
in illegal activity, specifically with their use of food stamps.  In the news conference on 
March 31, 1982, Bill Plante of CBS News asked Reagan the following in respect to new 
spending cuts: 
Social security and other programs such as that have a large and voting 
constituency.  But welfare programs, nutrition programs, food stamp programs, 
have a much smaller constituency.  Your critics charge that proportionally larger 
cuts are being made there.  How do you answer that? (Reagan, 1983a, p. 403) 
Reagan responded with the following:  
[W]e haven’t touched social security.  Food stamps, over the last 15 years, 
increased 16,000 percent.  And just recently we’ve been doing some investigating 
so that we can intelligently treat with [sic] a program of that kind.  And we have 
found in the first investigation that 57 percent of the stores that were investigated 
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are selling items for food stamps that are banned, that food stamps are—it’s 
illegal to use food stamps to buy those things.  (Reagan, 1983a, p. 404) 
The response did not address the fairness of cutting programs according to the recipients’ 
political clout.  Instead, Reagan justified the cuts by criminalizing the poor and those who 
serve them.  
It should be noted that Reagan justified cuts to the food stamp program in another 
way.  During an interview with reporters from the Wall Street Journal on February 3, 
1984, Reagan explains:  
Actually if there are individuals who suffer from our economic programs, they are 
people who’ve been dropped from various things like food stamps because they 
weren’t morally eligible for them.  Maybe some instances technically, but even in 
many cases, weren’t even technically eligible for those programs.  (Reagan, 
1985a, p. 158) 
Within his story, recipients of food stamps are either engaging in illegal activities or they 
are not “morally eligible” to receive the assistance.  With these depictions of the 
recipients of public assistance, cutting the programs is justified.  Social security is not 
“touched”, but by criminalizing the poor and claiming they are acting with moral 
turpitude, the poor are again the culprits in the story.  
 Additionally, Reagan’s criminalization of the poor also creates tension between 
those Reagan deems as the needy and non-needy poor.  This is clear in the following 
anecdote on food stamp abuse:  
For example, I had a message the other day from a man in a small town down in 
Mississippi.  And he was writing to me about food stamps in his area, because 
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there’s a 31-percent unemployment rate in that particular town.  And he was 
telling of some of the things, of people getting $2,400 a month and receiving food 
stamps.  Well, for them to do that means that someone else who really has need 
for them is being cheated and is not being able to get the help that they should 
have. (Reagan, 1984b, p. 1643) 
This anecdote, again, justifies cuts to the program, but it also pits the needy and non-
needy poor against one another.  Not only are the criminals and “morally ineligible” 
hurting the economy on the whole, they are hurting what Reagan would call the “truly 
needy”.   
The Problem of Dependency 
 In a speech delivered to the American Bar Association on August 1, 1983, Reagan 
justifies the reduction in social spending on the poor in another way.  He explains that 
there has been “[n]o overall improvement” in alleviating poverty “when government 
spending in the name of the poor was exploding” (Reagan, 1984b, p. 1114-5).  Reagan 
continues, “[B]etween 1971 and 1980, the percentage of American households dependent 
on welfare rose by 20 percent” (Reagan, 1984b, p. 1115).  The problem, as explained, 
gets even worse:     
This tragedy was accompanied by the increasing breakdown of families.  Nearly 
half of all poor families in 1980 were headed by women, and the number of single 
teenage mothers is estimated to have grown by 50 percent in the decade of the 
seventies.  The dramatic increase was clearly associated with a change in the 
nature of public assistance.  The emphasis shifted from F.D.R.’s model of direct 
payments to the needy.  We began supporting a growing army of professionals.  I 
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don’t question their good intentions, but their economic self-interest lay in 
extending dependency, not in ending it.  (Reagan, 1984b, p. 1115) 
In this scenario, welfare not only fails, but it creates a system of dependency.  Recipients 
become dependent on welfare, and administrators only add to this dependency.  
 In a radio address to the nation on the American family on December 3, 1983, 
Reagan explains the negative effects created by single mothers dependent on welfare.  
Specifically, he notes, “Too often their children grow up poor, malnourished, and lacking 
in motivation.  It’s a path to social and health problems, low school performance, 
unemployment, and delinquency” (Reagan, 1984b, p. 1648).  In Reagan’s story, poverty 
programs only create more poverty.   
 In accepting the presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention 
on August 23, 1984, Reagan explains how the situation of the poor was a function of 
previous administration policies supported by the Democrats.  In doing so, Reagan 
identifies the “cycle of dependency”:  
By nearly every measure, the position of poor Americans worsened under the 
leadership of our opponents.  Teenage drug abuse, out-of-wedlock births, and 
crime increased dramatically.  Urban neighborhoods and schools deteriorated.  
Those whom government intended to help discovered a cycle of dependency that 
could not be broken.  Government became a drug, providing temporary relief, but 
addiction as well. (Reagan, 1985b, p. 1176) 
In this story, welfare is a drug, and the recipients of that drug became addicted causing a 
litany of problems.   
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 In all of these speeches, Reagan provided solutions to this problem.  First, Reagan 
stressed that assistance is “being retargeted to the truly needy” (Reagan, 1984b, p. 1115).  
Second, he emphasized a plan to “strengthen families” to “reduce poverty”, and this can 
be done by “reducing the economic burdens of inflation and taxes” (Reagan, 1984b, p. 
1648).  Third, Reagan indicated a need to end “reliance on the government process” and 
renew “our faith in the human process” (Reagan, 1985b, p. 1176).  In other words, 
Reagan explains:  
[T]here is only one compassionate, sensible, and effective policies for Federal 
assistance:  We must focus domestic spending on the poor and bypass the 
bureaucracies by giving assistance directly to those who need it.  We must end 
dependency, eliminate quotas, and foster a vital, innovative economy that rewards 
all Americans according to their talent and hard work.  If we do, we can enhance 
our democratic ideals and make America a genuine opportunity society.  (Reagan, 
1985a, p. 342) 
The problem of dependency and its solution accomplishes two things.  First, it justifies 
Reagan’s economic policies, specifically his plan to further reduce spending on the poor.  
He is able to accomplish this by what Asen (2002) would call “gesturing to the New 
Deal” (p. 69) and decrying the policies, the policymakers, and the policy-administrators.  
Second, by referring to an economy based on “talent and hard work” he sets forth 
“moralistic, individualistic interpretations of a person’s socioeconomic status” (Asen, 
2002, p.69).    
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Helping the Poor 
  Denouncing the opposition had been central to Reagan’s poverty discourse in 
justifying previous polices, and while criminalizing the poor and explaining the problem 
of dependency were new narrative strategies, elements of these strategies could be found 
in the justification of the plan for economic recovery.  Specifically, the newer strategies 
depicted the welfare recipients as the culprits of economic troubles.  However, in 
justifying subsequent economic policies, Reagan depicted the welfare recipients in a 
different way, as the beneficiaries of economic policies.  
 First, in a news conference on September 28, 1982, Reagan again develops a 
response to the fairness of his economic policies.  He describes the fairness of the 
program in a different way.  He explains that the cuts and the tax policies are fair because 
they help to curb inflation and “those people who are on Aid for Dependent Children find 
that they have increased purchasing power because of the change in the inflation rate, 
people at the poverty level have about $600 more in purchasing power; median-income 
family in America has about $1,500 more purchasing power” (Reagan, 1983b, p. 1228).  
Therefore, in Reagan’s scenario, people receiving public assistance and even those not 
receiving public assistance, but still at the poverty level, are helped.  He elaborates by 
stating “their welfare dollars will now buy several hundred dollars more than they would 
before” (Reagan, 1983b, p. 1341).  
 Second, Reagan explains how the program of economic recovery is beneficial to 
everyone, including the poor.  Reagan notes, “A sparkling economy is the best hope for 
all who strive to pull themselves up.  And we have a program to do that.  It’s called 
economic recovery” (Reagan, 1984b, p. 1114).  This is clearly a part of what Asen (2002) 
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called the “Gospel of Wealth” (p.69).  With a strong economy, anyone is able to “pull 
themselves up”.  He continues, “you can only build a durable recovery with more 
freedom, not more government” (Reagan, 1984b, p. 1114).  In this story, everyone able to 
benefit from a strong economy, and expansive government programs can only undermine 
this effort.   
Assessing Narrative Probability and Narrative Fidelity 
 Was Reagan’s economic story successful?  At an instrumental level, the story was 
extremely successful.  The Washington Post described Reagan’s 1984 reelection as an 
“awesome victory” and “a huge majority of the electorate was also voting for its 
preference for a set of ideas and sentiments that Mr. Reagan has espoused” (“The Reagan 
Triumph,” 1984).  Moreover, the electorate wanted “what Mr. Reagan offered” (“The 
Reagan Triumph,” 1984, p. A14).  
Central to Reagan’s overwhelming victory was the economy.  The New York 
Times reported, “[I]t was the economy that set the basic pattern for President Reagan’s 
stunning re-election sweep” (Smith, 1984, p. A1).  The election gained “a resounding 
vote of confidence for his handling of the economy and used it to power a coast-to-coast 
landslide” (Smith, 1984, p. A1).  Polls indicated that the economy was more important 
than other issues Reagan espoused, “[T]he Times/CBS News poll showed that it was the 
electorate’s feelings about the economy more than Mr. Reagan’s appeals to traditional 
values or any specific vision for the future” (Smith, 1984, p. A1).  
 However, Reagan’s depiction of the poor did influence some individuals to 
support former Vice President Walter Mondale; as reported by the Washington Post, 
“Mondale supporters were influenced by the ‘fairness’ issue -- saying that they believed 
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Reagan favored the rich while Mondale would be sympathetic to the problems of the 
poor” (Broder, 1984, p.A1).  Nonetheless, considering that Reagan won by a “landslide” 
(Broder, 1984, p.A1), Mondale’s plan to “tax the rich and their corporations and use the 
money to comfort the poor and near-poor” was no match for Reagan’s vision of the poor 
becoming “unpoor” as a result of “industry and hard work” (Cohen, 1984, p. A27).  In 
other words, Reagan’s story of an “opportunity society” and discussion of the poor was 
far more successful than Mondale’s. 
 To understand why this story was successful, an assessment of narrative 
probability and narrative fidelity is necessary.  Reagan’s depiction of the opposition is 
consistent with the prior stories told in justifying the plan for economic recovery and the 
federalism proposal.  In justifying his economic polices, Reagan depicts the opposition as 
working to maintain the bureaucracy and not to working to alleviate poverty.  Reagan 
claims that any “horror stories” are the result of the “political demagoguery” of the 
opposition.  In addition, these individuals are also responsible or partly responsible for 
the poverty that many are experienced.  The coherence of this story is enhanced by the 
previous stories.   
 However, other that using the California anecdote, Reagan does not provide any 
specific evidence of “special-interest groups” being specifically responsible for the 
opposing stories, nor is he able to specifically explain what constitutes “political 
demagoguery”.  On the other hand, his reelection did hinge on the status of the economy; 
therefore, for the audience, it may have passed the “logic of good reasons”.  More 
importantly, if previous depictions were accepted, this story would “correspond” to what 
the audience already knows.   
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Reagan’s criminalizing of the poor is consistent with the depiction of the poor in 
the plan for economic recovery.  In that story, the welfare recipients were the culprits for 
the slow economy; therefore, criminalizing them would confirm the accepted story of 
economic recovery, by depicting the poor as working against the individual worker.  In 
this particular story, however, Reagan explicitly states the reason for the cuts to programs 
for the poor is because they are engaging in illegal activity.  In previous stories, Reagan 
made this claim implicitly.  Again, this story would pass the test of narrative fidelity 
because it is extends on what the audience already knows, and Reagan’s success in the 
1984 election would provide even more support for this claim.  It should also be noted 
that Reagan only criminalizes the poor and questions the moral character of the poor.  He 
does not question the moral character of the business owners that allow individuals to 
purchase the “banned” items with food stamps.   
 Reagan’s explanation of the problem of dependency would also meet the 
standards of narrative probability and narrative fidelity.  First, this story is coherent with 
the dysfunctional welfare system depicted in the plan for economic recovery.  Second, 
the “army of professionals” again suggests the bureaucratic growth created by the 
program.  Third, and most importantly, it is consistent “with the story of America” 
(Fisher, 1987, p. 156).  It decries the system of bureaucracy and promotes the system of 
individual growth.  It promotes the traditional conception of a family and the belief that if 
an individual works hard, he or she can accomplish anything.   
 The story of the impoverished being helped by the economic policies is consistent 
with the story told in the plan for economic recovery.  In the story of the plan for 
economic recovery, inflation was depicted as a primary cause for economic woes.  
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Therefore, if inflation was abated, everyone would benefit.  The savior for the poor is not 
government programs, it is the economy.   
Summary and Conclusions 
 As explained by newspaper accounts of the 1984 Presidential election, even 
though some voters in the 1984 election were influenced to vote for Mondale because of 
a disdain for Reagan’s policies toward the poor, Reagan’s handling of the economy 
served as an impetus for many to reelect.  Whether or not these economic policies were 
the result of increase economic growth or increased confidence in the economy is a 
matter for economists to decide.  However, there are some important rhetorical 
implications to Reagan’s story.  
 First, this discourse does provide evidence for Asen’s (2002) claim that Reagan 
“created a discursive context favorable to” mid-90s welfare reform (p. 68).  Reagan’s 
depictions of welfare recipients were similar to the depictions that Gring-Pemble (2001) 
claimed were dominant in hearings that led to the passage of 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).  By criminalizing 
the poor, questioning the moral character of the poor, and claiming the poor become 
dependent on welfare, Reagan provided the image of the “feckless” welfare recipient, an 
individual “poor values” (Gring-Pemble, 2001, p. 349).  By depicting the dependent 
mother as a teenager, Reagan set the tone for “welfare mothers as predominately 
immature youth” (Gring-Pemble, 2001, p. 353).  Moreover, by associating receipt of 
welfare with the breakdown of families, there is link between Reagan’s rhetoric and the 
rhetorical constructions that served “as evidence to support legislative proposals and 
policies designed to enforce marriage, paternal economic support, and material 
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dependence” (Gring-Pemble, 2003, p. 476).  While Reagan may not have been the first to 
depict welfare recipients in these ways, there is, at the very least, a connection between 
Reagan’s rhetoric and the rhetoric that dominated the PRWORA hearings. 
 Second, by telling a story in which the poor are the beneficiaries of economic 
growth and simultaneously claiming that welfare only creates more poverty while 
excluding of stories of welfare recipients rising from poverty, direct public assistance 
becomes a way to maintain poverty, and in Reagan’s story the only was to alleviate 
poverty is his economic policies.  In his story, even the truly needy would be unable to 
escape poverty with public assistance.  Public assistance becomes the creator of poverty.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
  
 From the analysis of the narrative rationality of Reagan’s poverty discourse, some 
significant conclusions can be made.  First, in many instances Reagan was able to 
repudiate the regimes of the past.  He also associated his opposition with previous 
regimes and blamed them for economic decline.  Second, Reagan used repetitive 
anecdotes to justify his policies.  Third, Reagan was able to construct narratives that met 
the standards of narrative probability and narrative fidelity; however, in the case of the 
federalism proposal, he failed to meet those standards.  Fourth, Reagan’s rhetorical 
construction of welfare recipients and the welfare system may have informed depictions 
that were prevalent in the PRWORA debates.  Reagan accomplished this through 
reconstructing poverty discourse through economic recovery, federalism and justification 
of economic policies. 
 Reagan was able to reconstruct poverty discourse through his plan for economic 
recovery.  He constructed a narrative that placed the individual worker as the victim of 
the increased spending on social programs.  The recipients of the benefits of these 
programs, specifically the individuals Reagan deemed the non-needy, became the 
victimizers in this narrative.  The non-needy were responsible for the growth in 
government and economic decline.  Reagan was able to defend his implication of the 
poor through the use of an anecdote from his experience as governor of California.  In the 
end, through the use of repetitive depictions within the anecdote, the intended audience 
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(Congress) judged this story to be correct, and Reagan’s plan for economic recovery 
passed.  In other words, for the audience, the story met the standards of narrative 
probability and narrative fidelity.  
 Reagan was able to reconstruct poverty discourse through his Federalism 
proposal.  Reagan proposed a “swap” that would devolve control of AFDC and the food 
stamp program to the states in exchange for the Federal Government assuming 
responsibility of Medicaid; however, this proposal was eventually dropped from the 
Federalism Legislation.  Even though this particular narrative failed to meet the standards 
of narrative probability and narrative fidelity, the narrative did reconstruct poverty 
discourse in two ways.  First, this narrative characterized poverty as a local concern.  
Second, this narrative pitted grants-in-aid programs, specifically AFDC and food stamps, 
against national defense.   
 Reagan was able to reconstruct poverty discourse through his justification of his 
economic policies.  He used four narratives to justify his plan to reduce government 
spending post-economic recovery.  Again, the reduction in spending included programs 
target toward the poor.  First, he denounced the opposition by claiming that they were 
engaging in “political demagoguery” or trying to inflame the public for political purpose.  
Moreover, this strategy claimed that the stories presented by the opposition that identified 
problems with reductions in spending were the result of the federal bureaucracy 
attempting to portray reductions in spending in a negative way.  Second, Reagan 
criminalized the poor and questioned the morality of the individuals receiving public 
assistance.  Third, Reagan explained the problems of welfare dependency, and claimed 
that an individual could best rise out of poverty through limited government and hard 
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work.  Fourth, a new depiction of the poor also emerged in this narrative.  Reagan 
depicted the poor and welfare recipients of welfare as the beneficiaries of his economic 
programs and policies.  Despite some complaints about the fairness of Reagan’s 
economic policies, the electorate judged his narrative to be coherent and consonant and 
reelected Reagan largely on his economic policies.  As a result of narratives depicting the 
poor as beneficiaries of reductions in spending and welfare as the cause of poverty, 
stories that suggest the poor can use government programs to improve their 
socioeconomic status are excluded.  
 Furthermore, there are links between Reagan’s rhetorical construction of 
welfare—recipients and the system itself—and the rhetorical construction leading to the 
passage of PRWORA.  Elements of the three depictions described by Gring-Pemble 
(2001) that dominated the PRWORA debates can be found in Reagan’s story and poverty 
discourse.  PRWORA attempted to “enforce marriage” (Gring-Pemble, 2003), and 
Reagan associated welfare receipt with family dysfunction.  Reagan’s discourse placed 
poverty as a local concern by attempting to devolve AFDC, and 1996 welfare reform 
replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families which gave states control 
of welfare (Gring-Pemble, 2001, p. 347).   Although this study did not track the 
development of Reagan’s rhetorical construction to identify a seamless link, it does 
provide significant evidence for Asen’s (2002) claim that Reagan provided the 
“discursive context” for the PRWORA debates (p. 68).   
Because of the language used by Lyndon Johnson in his War on Poverty, the 
reconstruction of poverty discourse was inevitable.  Zarefsky (1977) explains:  
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[T]he President’s call for “unconditional victory” raised expectations against 
which later performance would be judged.  If those who were caught up in a 
revolution of rising expectations found their expectations unmatched by the 
program’s performance, it was likely that they would blame the program.  After 
all, the Administration had called for total victory and had claimed that the nation 
had the knowledge to banish poverty. (p. 356) 
The expectations created by the Johnson Administration’s rhetoric made the story told by 
Reagan consonant.  Government assistance to alleviate poverty was supposed to work.  
When it failed to meet the high expectations, Reagan’s denouncement of the programs 
seemed to be on point.   
 However, Reagan did more than simply blame the programs of the War on 
Poverty.  The programs failed, but they were also responsible for the failure of the 
economy.  Reagan was able to expand on this criticism because he had the power to 
repudiate and reshape political order, and this can explain why his depictions of the 
welfare system and welfare recipients still prevalent in the PRWORA debate. 
Directions for Future Research 
  First, Skowronek’s (1997) “Recurrent Structures of Presidential Authority” (p. 
36) emerges as an effective way of understanding Presidential rhetoric.  What a president 
says is largely a function of the authority that he has.  Reagan had the authority to reshape 
government.  His rhetoric reflected that authority.  Future studies examining Presidential 
rhetoric should consider the power a president has to reshape government and repudiate 
previous regimes.   
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Second, in reference to narrative probability and narrative fidelity, Hart (1997) 
explains, “Ultimately, of course, there can be no final determination on such matters, for 
accuracy and goodness often exist in the eye of the beholder” (p. 97).  Determination of 
narrative probability and narrative fidelity is largely audience dependent.  Perhaps then 
the task of the critic is to account for the audience’s acceptance of fantastic or improbable 
narratives, or at least, to note that the stories are at odds with reality.  This study focused 
on how Reagan’s discourse shaped reality to justify his policies; however, future studies 
could do more to determine whether Reagan’s depiction of the poor was representative of 
reality.  Future studies could focus on the accuracy of Reagan’s poverty discourse.   
Third, although this study made reference to challenges to Reagan’s narrative, it 
did not describe these challenges at length.  Who was challenging Reagan’s poverty 
discourse?  Were they special-interest groups? Were the challengers and opposition 
government officials?  What rhetorical strategies did they use?  It would be worthwhile to 
understand how a president of reconstruction is challenged. 
Stories that Affirm 
 This study reveals that the depictions of welfare recipients and the welfare system 
during the PRWORA debate can be traced to the depictions created by Ronald Reagan.  
This may be a result of Lewis’ (1987) claim that in the arena of public policy, Reagan’s 
narrative rationality has prevailed (p. 288).  Moreover, Fisher (1987) claims that 
Reagan’s narrative will remain dominant until effective story can refute it (p. 156).  
 Therefore, if a rhetor seeks to change the depictions and policies of the status quo, 
then the rhetor must construct an effective story that refutes the current depictions and 
policies.  However, Asen (2002) explains, “Affirming images must be crafted and 
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circulated to create reasons for addressing the concerns of the poor” (p. 239).  Moreover, 
“affirmative images are necessary to motivate policymakers to enact potentially 
efficacious reforms” (Asen, 2002, p. 239).  Consequently, to change the status quo, the 
story must include depictions that both debunk current images of the poor and affirm 
positive images.  However, in order to change poverty discourse, this story of the poor 
would need to be told by a rhetor with the authority to repudiate current structures of 
power. 
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